Knowledge likely held by others affects speakers’ choices of referential expressions at different stages of discourse by Achim, Amélie M. et al.
Knowledge likely held by others affects speakers’ choices of referential expressions at 
different stages of discourse
Amélie M. Achima,b, André Achimc and Marion Fossardd
aDépartement de psychiatrie et neurosciences, Université Laval, Quebec, QC, Canada
Effective communication requires adjusting one’s discourse to be understood by the addressee. While some suggest that 
choices of referring expressions are dependent on the addressee’s accessibility to the referent, there is also evidence for an 
egocentric bias in speech production. This study relied on two new experimental tasks designed to assess whether speakers 
adapt their choices of referential expressions when introducing movie characters that are either likely known or likely 
unknown by their addressee, and when maintaining or reintroducing these characters at a later point in the discourse. 
Results revealed an adjustment to the addressee in the use of character’s names (increased for likely known characters) and 
definite expressions (increased for likely unknown characters) observed at all the discourse stages. Use of indefinite 
expressions and names was affected by the participant’s own knowledge specifically when introducing the characters. 
These results indicate that speakers take their addressee’s likely knowledge into account at multiple discourse stages.
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Introduction
In everyday life, it is very common to be involved in social 
situations that lead us to share ideas or to get involved in 
cooperative tasks. In such situations, we often use 
language to build upon previously established 
common ground information and develop newly 
shared knowledge with the person we are conversing 
with, that is, with our addressee. In other words, addres-
sees necessarily possess some knowledge that they have 
previously acquired and once the interaction is in pro-
gress speakers can quickly assess their addressee’s 
expertise on a given topic and adjust their speech 
accordingly.
This quick adjustment was initially demonstrated by 
Isaacs and Clark (Isaacs & Clark, 1987) who gave pairs 
of participants two identical sets of postcards of 
common New York landmarks. One participant acted 
as the speaker who had to describe the scenes in a pre-
determined order so that the other participant, the 
matcher, could arrange his cards in the same order. 
The study showed that speakers are sensitive to their 
addressees’ knowledge, using their partner’s responses 
to adjust quickly after the beginning of the task by 
using more proper names of places when interacting 
with addressees with a good knowledge of New York
and more physical descriptions of places with addressees 
that show a limited knowledge of New York. Interest-
ingly, speakers who were not initially familiar with the 
New York landmarks learned the names of the places 
from their addressee’s feedback when interacting with 
an addressee with a good knowledge of New York and 
they increased their use of proper names through the 
six trials of the same task. Isaacs and Clark’s study thus 
showed that over the course of a conversation speakers 
can acquire knowledge about what constitutes initial 
common ground, build new common ground knowl-
edge, and use this common ground information when 
formulating their subsequent messages.
Although feedback is one important source of infor-
mation about another person’s knowledge, other 
sources of information can also provide insights into an 
addressee’s likely knowledge of a given referent 
(Achim, Guitton, Jackson, Boutin, & Monetta, 2013; 
Fussell & Krauss, 1992). For instance, there is evidence 
that speakers adjust their messages when speaking to 
someone with a foreign accent (Kingsburry, 1968, cited 
in Krauss (1987)), when speaking to close friends 
(Fussell and Krauss, 1985, cited in Krauss (1987), or 
when speaking to someone with established shared 
knowledge (Heller, Gorman, & Tanenhaus, 2012). In a
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which should be used for any reference to this work
task used by Heller et al. (Heller et al., 2012), the speaker 
and his addressee first had to learn the names of some 
abstract shapes together, while the speaker learned 
other shape names alone. The study showed that speak-
ers use more names for the shapes for which the other 
participant had also previously learnt the names, in com-
parison to shapes for which the other participant had not 
learnt the names. Interestingly, names were also used for 
shapes for which only the speaker had learnt the name, 
but shape names were in this case typically accompanied 
by descriptive information, suggesting that speakers 
were able to distinguish shared from privileged infor-
mation. Overall, these different studies provide evidence 
that speakers are sensitive to their addressee’s knowl-
edge, a phenomenon known as audience design or reci-
pient design (Brennan, Galati, & Kuhlen, 2010; Horton & 
Gerrig, 2002; Newman-Nrolund et al., 2009).
Despite these established evidence that speakers can 
adapt their verbal productions to their addressees’ 
knowledge, egocentric biases have also been clearly 
documented both in speech comprehension and in 
speech production (Horton & Keysar, 1996; Wardlow 
Lane & Ferreira, 2008; Wardlow Lane, Groisman, & Fer-
reira, 2006). For example, in a series of experiments 
Wardlow Lane et al. (e.g. Wardlow Lane & Ferreira, 
2008; Wardlow Lane et al., 2006) showed that speakers 
inappropriately refer to privileged objects (i.e. objects 
that their addressee cannot see) when presenting 
shared objects to another person, even when explicitly 
asked to avoid references to the privileged objects. 
Given that such egocentric biases are particularly promi-
nent when participants are under time pressure (Horton 
& Keysar, 1996), it was suggested that speakers plan their 
utterances in an egocentric way and only subsequently 
adjust their utterances to take common ground into 
account (Horton & Keysar, 1996; Wu & Keysar, 2007).
These previously mentioned studies mostly focused on 
how new referents are introduced when an addressee has 
to identify the referents from a given set. While interest-
ing, these studies are however not very informative of 
how reference choices are adjusted during a continuous 
conversation. Furthermore, these previously mentioned 
studies typically analysed the content of the referential 
expressions (e.g. “circle” versus “small circle”) used by  
the speakers during the verbal interaction, while few 
such studies considered the choices of reference 
markers (e.g. an indefinite marker as in “a circle”, a definite 
marker as in “the circle” or a pronoun such as “it”). Refer-
ence content and reference markers are two distinct 
characteristics of referring expressions that could even-
tually depend on distinct sources of influence. Different 
theoretical models have suggested that choices of refer-
ence markers are affected by the accessibility – or the
cognitive status – of the referents in the unfolding dis-
course model, including Ariel’s accessibility marking hier-
archy (Ariel, 1990, 1996) or Gundel et al ’. s givenness 
hierarchy (Gundel, Hedberg, & Zacharski, 1993, 2012). 
For instance, unaccented pronouns are expected for 
highly accessible referents that are maintained in focus, 
whereas more explicit expressions such as indefinite or 
definite noun phrases are expected for less accessible 
referents. However, most studies that initially supported 
these models relied on non-interactive tasks (e.g. Arnold 
& Griffin, 2007; Hendriks, Koster, & Hoeks, 2014; Vogels, 
Krahmer, & Maes, 2013), or on tasks in which accessibility 
varies in parallel for the speaker and for the addressee as 
the experimental task progresses (e.g. Champagne-Lavau 
et al., 2009; Fukumura, van Gompel, & Pickering, 2010). 
Given that the verbal interactions studies that appropri-
ately documented audience design focused on reference 
content and that the studies of reference markers typically 
relied on non-interactive tasks, there is surprisingly little 
evidence supporting the suggestion that speakers’ 
choices of reference markers are influenced by the acces-
sibility of the referent for their addressee during verbal 
interactions. It is thus possible that speakers could 
adjust their reference content but not their reference 
markers depending on the accessibility of the referent 
for their addressee.
Two recent studies assessed the reference markers 
used during verbal interactions between a speaker and 
his addressee, and both studies separately manipulated 
the accessibility of the referents for the speaker and for 
the addressee (Fukumura & van Gompel, 2012; Vogels, 
Krahmer, & Maes, 2015). Both studies revealed that redu-
cing the speaker’s accessibility to the target referent sig-
nificantly reduced their use of pronouns, even for 
referents that were highly accessible to the addressee 
(Fukumura & van Gompel, 2012; Vogels et al., 2015). 
While Fukumura and van Gompel (Fukumura & van 
Gompel, 2012) proposed that referential choices are 
determined by the accessibility of the referent in the 
speaker’s own discourse model, the subsequent study 
by Vogels et al. (2015) suggested that the accessibility 
for the addressee can also influence the choices of refer-
ence markers, at least when the referent is accessible for 
the speaker. More specifically, when referents were 
highly accessible for themselves, speakers used pro-
nouns to a greater extent if the referent was also acces-
sible for the addressee (which was the case in their 
second experiment) than when the referent was not 
salient for the addressee (which was the case in their 
first experiment). The accessibility for the speaker and 
the accessibility for the addressee may thus represent 
two complementary sources of influence on the 
choices of reference markers.
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Of note, in normal conversations, discourse is typically 
public and conversational partners therefore share the 
same linguistic context (Arnold, 2010). Hence, the two 
studies presented above had to artificially dissociate 
the discourse context between the speaker and his 
addressee by presenting part of the linguistic context 
only to the speaker through earphones. While linguistic 
context is most often shared, other factors can give rise 
to different levels of referential accessibility between 
the speaker and his addressee.
For example, we have recently documented that 
speakers adjust their choices of reference content 
based on their addressee’s likely prior knowledge of 
the referents, even when these referents are introduced 
for the first time to an addressee (Achim, Fossard, 
Couture, & Achim, 2015). That study relied on the intro-
duction of a series of movie characters that were either 
typically well-known (assumed to be accessible) or typi-
cally little-known (not assumed to be accessible), and 
we notably showed that speakers more often use 
descriptive information when presenting little-known 
movie characters to their addressee, even when control-
ling for their own knowledge of the characters. That 
study documented an effect of the addressee’s likely 
accessibility for referents but focused on the reference 
content and did not consider the reference markers 
used by the speakers when introducing the movie char-
acters. Here, a first objective was to further analyse the 
data from that initial study to determine whether the 
speakers also adapted their choices of reference 
markers on a stimulus-by-stimulus basis when present-
ing unconnected stimulus items that vary in terms of 
the likeness that their addressee will know them (i.e. 
likely known versus likely unknown items).
Then, a second objective was to determine if adjust-
ments to the addressee’s likely knowledge are also 
observed in narrative speech and if so, if this effect is 
limited to the initial introduction of the referent in the 
narration or also observed for subsequent discourse 
stages. The discourse stages that can be distinguished 
include introducing new referents (this time in a narra-
tive context instead of in an identification context) as 
well a maintaining a referent in focus or later reintrodu-
cing a referent that was previously not in focus in the 
recent discourse.
In addition, given evidence that people sometimes 
have difficulties to inhibit their own perspective to take 
their interaction partner’s perspective into account, a 
third objective was to assess the effect of the speaker’s 
own knowledge on their choices of reference markers 
at the different discourse stages.
Based on Ariel (1990, 1996) and Gundel et al. (1993, 
2012), and based on prior evidence of audience design
for the introduction of new referents (Gorman, Gegg-
Harrison, Marsh, & Tanenhaus, 2013; Heller et al., 2012; 
Isaacs & Clark, 1987), we expected to observe an adjust-
ment of reference markers choices as a function of the 
addressee’s likely knowledge when introducing new 
referents, both in the identification task and in the narra-
tion task. Along with expecting such a modulation for the 
introduction of new referents, we also expected a similar 
modulation in narrative speech when reintroducing a 
previously introduced referent, but not when maintain-
ing an already salient referent because the degree of 
accessibility is already high and prior knowledge 
should not be necessary to facilitate access to the refer-
ent. We further expected that participant’s referential 
choices would depend on their own knowledge, at 
least to the extent that people cannot use a name for a 
referent that they do not themselves know, forcing 
them to chose an alternative referring expression. 
However, there is evidence that people sometimes 
have difficulties to inhibit their own perspective to take 
their interaction partner’s perspective into account 
(Apperly et al., 2010; Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Brauner, 
2000) and it is thus possible that referential choices 
could reflect the speaker’s own perspective rather than 
that – or in addition to that – of their interaction partner.
Currently, little is known about the processes involved 
in discourse construction during natural interactions. 
Demonstrating that discursive choices are influenced 
not only by personal knowledge but also by the addres-
see’s likely knowledge of the referent would provide 
empirical support to Ariel’s accessibility model (Ariel, 
1990, 1996) and Gundel et al.’s givenness hierarchy 
(Gundel et al., 1993, 2012), and would further suggest 
the involvement of knowledge inference processes that 
can take place at different times before or during a 
verbal interaction.
Method
Participants
Forty participants were recruited from the community 
through ads in local media and through word of 
mouth. They were all native French speakers aged 
between 18 and 40 years old (mean age = 24.2; 32 
men; mean education = 14.2 years). Potential partici-
pants were not eligible to take part in the study if they 
reported a history of neurological disorder, head 
trauma or psychiatric disorder or reported taking a psy-
choactive medication when asked for screening pur-
poses. The local ethics board approved the study and 
all participants provided informed consent.
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communication during the verbal interaction. Before 
each trial of the task, both partners were presented with 
an identical set of image cards. For this study, the partici-
pants received the image cards in a predetermined order 
whereas the addressee received cards with the same 
images in a random order. For each set of image cards, 
the participant had to present each card in the given 
order so that the addressee could replace her set in the 
same order. The addressee could give some feedback to 
signal understanding (e.g. “ok”) or to point out misunder-
standings or ambiguities (e.g. “can you give me more 
details”), and the participant could provide additional 
information. The procedure was repeated seven times 
with different sets of card (see below).
For this study, the role of the addressee was held by a 
trained research assistant, always a woman in her 20s, 
which was required to standardise the feedback given 
for the different items of the card set. While the use of 
confederate addressees has been criticised as it can 
introduce biases (Kuhlen & Brennan, 2013), for example 
linked to the timing of their responses, here our analyses 
focussed on the reference marker produced at the onset 
of the reference (see below for more details) and hence 
before the feedback had a chance to occur for the 
current trial. Focussing our analyses on the reference 
markers produced at the onset of the referential 
expression minimised the potential impact of the con-
federate’s feedback on the current trial while allowing 
the necessary control over the knowledge displayed by 
the addressee for the stimuli of the previous trials.
To avoid that the participants assume all image cards 
are known by the addressee, which would happen if the 
same addressee performs the task several times with the 
same images, a concealment strategy was developed to 
make the participants believe that, though the addressee 
was part of our research team and had done the task 
before, she was discovering the sequences of images 
used with them for the first time (i.e. we told them that
Table 1. Likely known and likely unknown characters that the participants had to present in the identification task.
Survey 1 Survey 2
Character Movie
% of men thinking most
women know the movie <25% 25–50% 51–75% >75%
Likely known characters
Harry Potter Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Stonea 86 12% 4% 12% 79%
Jack Sparrow Pirates of the Caribbeana 86 4% 21% 21% 54%
E.T. E.T. the Extra-Terrestriala 86 3% 7% 21% 69%
Gandalf The Lord of the Rings 85 25% 7% 18% 50%
Maximus Gladiator 79 --- --- --- ---
Likely unknown characters 0 67% 22% 4% 7%
Leonidas 300a 29 52% 22% 12% 8%
Martin Riggs Lethal Weapona 14 40% 35% 5% 20%
Don Vito Corleone The godfathera 21 24% 33% 24% 19%
Wolverine X-men 29 59% 12% 29% 0%
Alex A Clockwork Orange 0 67% 22% 4% 7%
aIndicates movies also included in the narration task.
Procedure
Because the image set is based on movies (see Table 1), 
participants first completed a questionnaire to deter-
mine their general knowledge of each of the movies 
included in our study (i.e. they answered if they had 
seen the movies or not), and then completed a series 
of cognitive tasks for another study (Achim et al., 2013; 
Achim, Ouellet, Roy, & Jackson, 2012) before performing 
our experimental task.
Experimental task
The current project is based on the referential communi-
cation paradigm (Champagne-Lavau et al., 2009; Clark & 
Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986), which reproduces a communication 
situation that implies a social interaction based on the col-
laboration between two partners. As shown in Figure 1, an  
opaque screen was placed between the two partners, one 
being a female experimenter, to prevent non-verbal
Figure 1. Illustration of the procedure used for this study. The 
participant (on the left) has an image set with images placed 
in a predetermined order. The addressee (on the right) has the 
same images in a random order and has to replace them in 
the correct order based on the verbal utterances of the 
participant.
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the images were different for every participant, which 
was in fact not the case). More specifically, the images 
were presented in sealed envelopes and participants 
were told that the addressee had previously done the 
task but each time with different sets of images, so 
they had not been exposed to the images that were in 
the envelopes. A pre-test previously confirmed the 
success of this strategy, with none of the 10 pilot subjects 
reporting suspecting that the addressee was familiar 
with the material used for the task.
Stimuli
The material consisted of images taken from movies that 
either could be safely assumed to be known by women 
in their 20s (the likely known condition) or could not 
be assumed to be known by women in their 20s (the 
likely unknown condition). Classification of the movies 
into the likely known or likely unknown categories was 
confirmed by two surveys. The first survey included 27 
movie titles. The 33 participants (19 women and 14 
men, aged between 20 and 30-years-old) indicated if 
they had seen the movie or not and whether they 
would assume that most women in their 20s had seen 
the movie. This allowed us to eliminate the movies for 
which there was little agreement on whether it was 
likely known or not (9 movies) and those that had 
been seen by too few people (6 movies). For the remain-
ing 12 movies, we performed a second survey in which 
54 participants (22 women and 32 men, aged between 
18 and 30-years-old) were again questioned about the 
movies but also about the three main male characters 
in each movie, confirming that the movies and their 
main characters were correctly classified into the likely 
known (5 movies) and likely unknown (7 movies) cat-
egories. From these 12 movies, 10 were selected for 
our final stimulus set (5 likely known and 5 likely 
unknown). Results from the 2 surveys are presented in 
Table 1 for each of these 10 movies. These stimuli were 
used to create the stimulus sets for an identification 
task and a narration task (see below). The identification 
task was always performed before the narration task.
Identification task
The identification task was based on a single stimulus set 
representing 10 different male movie characters, 5 from 
likely known movies and 5 from likely unknown movies 
(see Table 1 and Figure 1). This task allowed us to deter-
mine the reference markers used for the introduction of 
likely known and likely unknown referents in the context 
of an identification task, consistent with our first objec-
tive. As described in the Experimental task section, par-
ticipants were asked to present the cards to the 
addressee so that the addressee could place her 10
image cards in the same order. For the identification 
task there was no obvious links between the card, and 
participants thus presented each character one at the 
time. The addressee knew all the characters of the 
likely known movies and was trained to provide feed-
back as if she knew none of the characters from the 
likely unknown movies, meaning that she was asked to 
disregard any movie-related information provided 
about these characters (ex: ignore the character’s 
name, role in the movie, movie title, etc.), and to 
instead strictly rely on the visually descriptive infor-
mation provided by the participant as a basis to identify 
the movie characters from the likely unknown condition.
This material was created so that participants had to 
take into consideration the knowledge that they attri-
bute to the addressee for each of the different movie 
characters (i.e. which movie character’s are likely 
known) on an image-by-image basis in order to 
produce appropriate referential information.
Narration task
In line with our second objective, the narration task allowed 
us to determine whether the use of certain reference 
markers is affected by the likely known or likely unknown 
nature of the referents at different discourse stages in nar-
rative speech. More specifically, this task allowed us to 
examine the introduction of likely known and likely 
unknown referents, this time in a narrative context, and 
also the maintenance of a referent in focus and the reintro-
duction of a referent at a later point in the story.
As depicted in Figure 2, each of the six stimulus sets 
for the narrative task included six images, all from a 
same movie (three likely known movies and three likely 
unknown movies, representing a subset of the movies 
used for the identification task, see Table 1), forming 
six scenes that each involved two male characters. The 
images were selected so that, for each scene, images 1 
and 2 focused on the main character, images 3 and 4 
focused on the second character and images 5 and 6 
focused again on the main (first) character. This 
allowed us to collect data on the referential expressions 
used to introduce, maintain or reintroduce the main 
character, that is, covering all three discourse stages 
(Colle, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, & van der Lely, 2008; 
Van der Lely, 1997). For these six narration card sets, 
the participants were asked to tell the story of the 
scene so that the addressee could place her cards in 
the same order. Again, the addressee provided feedback 
as if she knew the characters of the likely known movies, 
but not those of the likely unknown movies. The addres-
see was asked to maintain this distinction regardless of 
how the character had been introduced in the identifi-
cation task. The action could however sometimes
5
disambiguate which character was being referred to, for 
example, if there was only one character performing the 
mentioned action in the image set. Hence, even if a 
name was used for a likely unknown character, the 
addressee sometimes had enough information to ident-
ify the image without making a clarification demand. On 
the other hand, even for likely known characters, clarifi-
cations could be requested by the addressee if the infor-
mation provided did not allow her to select a targeted 
image. For example, clarification would be requested if 
the participant says “Character X is fighting”, when char-
acter X is fighting in two different images.
For both the identification and the narration tasks, 
participants were requested not to name the actors 
and to really focus on the characters.
Data processing and analyses
The interactions were tape-recorded and then tran-
scribed verbatim. We then extracted the references to
the main character and, as shown in Table 2, we coded 
whether the referential expression began with (a) a 
name, (b) an indefinite marker, (c) a definite marker or 
(d) an unaccented pronoun. The definite markers cat-
egory was widely defined to include definite and posses-
sive expressions a well as a few demonstratives and 
accented pronouns that are thought to signal an inter-
mediate level of accessibility (Ariel, 1990, 1996; Cornish, 
1999).
Identification task
For the identification task, we coded the reference 
marker for each character of the card set, for a total of 
10 references per participant (i.e. 5 for likely known 
and 5 for likely unknown characters).
Narration task
For the narration task, we also coded the reference 
marker used to refer to the main character, but this
Figure 2. Illustration of the material used for one of the six sequences of the narration task.
Table 2. Types of reference markers.
Type Included in that category Example
Character’s names (CN) Names “Harry Potter”
Indefinite markers (IN) Indefinite “un monsieur” (a man)
Definite markers (D+) Definite
Possessive
Demonstrative
Accented pronouns (‘disjoint” in French)
“Le monsieur” (the man)
“Son ami” (his friend)
“Ce monsieur” (this/that man)
“… et donc lui, il…” (… and thus, HE…)
Unaccented pronouns (PR) Clitic pronouns
Zero pronouns
“Il marche” (he walks)
“… ,marche…” (… , walks…)
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time there were several mentions of the main character 
within each narrative sequence, and for each reference 
we had to determine whether it occurred while introdu-
cing, maintaining in focus or reintroducing the referent. 
These reference stages were not systematically linked 
to specific images in the card sets, requiring an alterna-
tive way of identifying the discourse stages.
To identify the references linked to each discourse 
stages (introduction, maintaining or reintroduction), nar-
rative speech was thus first divided into clausal units (C-
units). A C-unit is a maximal grammatical unit consisting 
of an independent clause together with any dependent 
clauses embedded within it (Biber, Johansson, Leech, 
Conrad, & Finegan, 1999). Structured around a verb 
phrase, a clause typically contains two main parts: the 
subject and the predicate, semantically representing 
the topic (what is being talked about) and the 
comment (what is being said about the topic). A C-unit 
may be a simple clause (a single clause), such as “the 
man goes to the hospital” or a complex clause (a main 
clause with one or more dependent clauses) such as 
“he goes to his bedside to take care of him” or “when 
his son learns the news he runs to the hospital to go 
and see his father”. Clearly incomplete utterances or 
repeated words were merged with more complete 
clauses to form a C-unit (ex: “the right hand man … the 
character who’s the right hand man comes to see 
him”). On the other hand, coordinated or juxtaposed 
clauses, such as “the man goes to the hospital // and 
then (he) sits by his son’s bed” or “he runs, // (he) 
jumps into the train”, were divided in two clauses (as indi-
cated with // in the examples) and counted as two clausal 
units as they each function as an independent clause, 
which holds true whether or not they express explicitly 
the subject of the second clause (as indicated in brackets 
in the examples).
A second research assistant also divided 10% of the 
transcribed verbatim (i.e. the verbatims of four partici-
pants for each of the six car sets) into clauses to evaluate 
the reliability of our initial division into C-units. This 
revealed that 18/283 (6.3%) C-units in these re-examined 
verbatims had been kept together when they should 
have been divided, which resulted in the exclusion of 
the second C-unit and its reference marker (typically a 
clitic or zero pronoun used for a second action by a 
same character) from our analyses, whereas 4/283 
(1.4%) C-units had been unnecessarily divided, which 
produced spurious extra C-units. These error rates were 
judged acceptable given the challenges that this type 
of work can represent and the original scoring was 
accepted as is.
For each C-unit thus identified, we extracted the 
reference to the main character and coded the type of
expression used to refer to him (see Table 2). Occur-
rences in which the main character was mentioned 
together with the second character as a plural 
pronoun (e.g. they) or plural description (e.g. the two 
boys) were excluded from the analyses. This was done 
to focus the analyses on individualised mentions of 
the main character for which our survey had established 
his likely known or likely unknown categorisation. 
Across all participants, there were 69 cases of plurals 
for the likely known movies and 103 cases for the 
likely unknown movies.
For each narrative sequence, the first individualised 
mention of the main character was considered as the 
introduction of that character. To distinguish the 
other discourse stages, namely maintaining of the 
main character or reintroduction of the main character, 
for each individualised mention of the main character 
after its initial introduction we determined whether it 
occurred in a C-unit where (1) the main character 
was present and in focus in the immediately preceding 
C-unit (maintaining); (2) the main character was not 
present or clearly not in focus in the immediately pre-
ceding C-unit (reintroduction). Given that there is no 
unique grammatical way of determining whether a 
character is in focus or not, we asked three different 
research assistants to rate their subjective impression 
of the character that was the most salient (i.e. con-
sidered in focus) for all the clauses in which the 
main character was present along with another 
character. Cases where the main character in focus 
could not clearly be determined by convergence 
between the raters or after consultations to resolve 
inter-rater discrepancies were excluded from the ana-
lyses (24 cases across all participants), to keep only 
the clear maintains and clear reintroductions for sub-
sequent analyses.
While discourse is a world of liberty and some 
decisions required more subjective interpretations than 
others, the well-defined procedure that we developed 
and strictly applied for separating the C-units and deter-
mining the discourse stages provided a systematic way 
of identifying the different discourse stages.
Statistical analyses
First, answers to our self-report movie knowledge ques-
tionnaire were used to classify, for each movie from 
which the character stimuli were drawn, whether each 
participant had seen it or not. Then, for each type of 
reference marker presented in Table 2 (names, indefinite, 
definite or unaccented pronouns), we used logistic 
mixed model analyses to assess the effect of the addres-
see’s knowledge (two levels: likely known, likely 
unknown) and its interaction with the task/stage (four
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levels: identification task, and the three stages of the nar-
ration task, namely introduction, maintaining, reintro-
duction). These effects were tested by comparing
regression models with or without the effect of interest
(see the Supplement for more details on these analyses).
When testing the interaction, the identification task was
specified as the reference stage from which changes in
parameters were assessed for the other three task/
stages. These analyses were performed using only the
references produced for the movies the participants
had themselves seen according to the movie knowledge
questionnaire in order to control for their own
knowledge.
For each participant in each condition, an empirical
logit transformation was first applied to accommodate
the small counts. While this transformation was necess-
ary to avoid counts of zeros when applying the logistic
mixed modelling analyses, we noticed that it introduced
a bias when there were more references to the charac-
ters in one condition than the other, which was the case
with more movies and hence more references kept in
the analyses for the likely known then for the likely
unknown movies (see the Supplement for more
details). The logistic mixed model analyses were thus
complemented with paired-sample t-tests on the pro-
portions for the likely known and likely unknown con-
ditions. Since the differences in proportions were far
from being normally distributed, the probability of the
observed t-values was assessed via label permutations
(i.e. random attribution of the likely known and likely
unknown status for each subject), separately for each
task/stage. This allowed us to estimate the empirical
probability associated with the observed t-value (i.e.
how often a t-value of this magnitude is observed by
chance). Typically, 1000 random reassignments were
performed to establish the probability. If, however, the
observed probability was then within the 95% confi-
dence interval of the significance threshold (alpha
= .05; i.e. between ranks 36 and 63 of the 1000
random t’s), the number of sign reassignments was
raised to 20,000 to get a finer evaluation of the
probability.
The same analytic steps were then employed to
examine the effect of the participants’ personal knowl-
edge (also two levels: seen by the participant or not
seen by the participant according to the movie knowl-
edge questionnaire). These analyses were performed
keeping only the referential expressions produced for
the likely unknown stimulus items. This restriction to
the likely unknown items controlled for the addressee’s
likely knowledge, allowing us to determine if partici-
pants were influenced by their own knowledge for
trials in which their knowledge would be better
inhibited to favour the addressee’s perspective (e.g. 
the addressee was unlikely to identify these characters 
by their names).
In addition, these separate analyses of the effect of 
the addressee’s likely knowledge (likely known versus 
likely unknown movies) and of the participant’s own 
knowledge were favoured given that there were very 
few instances of likely known movies that the partici-
pants had not themselves seen, and as such we could 
not assess simultaneously both variables (participant’s 
knowledge and addressee’s likely knowledge) and their 
interaction.
Results
The first 12 participants had missing data given that we 
initially administered only one likely known and one 
likely unknown narrative sequence (instead of all 3 
sequences of each type), both randomly selected from 
the movies that the participant had seen. After nine par-
ticipants, we then decided to increase the number of 
sequences. Participant 10 did 3 narrative sequences, par-
ticipants 11 and 12 did four sequences and the remain-
ing 28 participants performed all 6 narrative sequences. 
While having less narrative sequences for 12 of our par-
ticipant could be seen as a limitation of this study, there 
were no objective reasons to completely exclude these 
participants from our analyses. All participants did the 
full version of the movie questionnaire and the full 
version of the identification task including all ten images.
Results from the movie questionnaire
Of the 10 movies used for the identification task, the par-
ticipants had seen a mean of 4.3/5 likely known and 2.6/5 
likely unknown movies. When considering the 6 movies 
used for the narration task, participants had seen a 
mean of 2.5/3 likely known and 1.4/3 likely unknown 
movies.
Results from the experimental tasks
The proportions of each type of markers used for the 
likely known and for the likely unknown movie charac-
ters are presented in Figure 3, as well as in Tables 3–6. 
The following sections present the results from the logis-
tic model analyses for each type of reference marker 
(names, indefinite, definite or unaccented pronouns). 
The statistical comparisons (effect of addressee’s knowl-
edge or effect of participant’s knowledge) performed 
separately for each task/stages (identification, introduc-
tion, maintaining and reintroduction) are presented in
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Tables 3–6, including the comparisons from the logistic 
modelling and from the t-tests.
Character’s names
The comparisons of logistic models revealed an effect of 
the addressee’s likely knowledge (X2(2) = 66.8, p < .001) 
and a significant interaction between the addressee’s 
likely knowledge and task/discourse stage (X2(3) = 19.4, 
p < .001) on the production of names. As presented in 
Table 3, the effect of the addressee’s likely knowledge 
was significant for all four task/stages, characters’ 
names being more often used for the likely known 
movies. In the model that included the interaction, the 
parameters indicated that compared to the effect of 
the addressee’s knowledge observed for identification
task (selected as the reference in the model), the
effects were significantly greater for the introduction
stage (β = 1.10, SE = .29, t = 3.77) and the reintroduction
stage of the narration task (β = .93, SE = .31, t = 2.99),
but not for the maintaining stage (β = .12, SE = .26, t =
0.46)
For the participant’s own knowledge, comparisons of
logistic models revealed a significant effect (X2(2) = 30.7,
p < .001) as well as an interaction with task/discourse
stages (X2(3) = 13.8, p = .003). As shown in Table 3,
names were more often used when the participant had
seen the movies, but these effects were restricted to
the identification task and to the introduction of the nar-
ration task. In the model that included the interaction,
the parameters indicated that, compared to the identifi-
cation task, the effects were significantly reduced for the
Figure 3. Proportion of trial for which participants used each type of reference markers during the identification task and for each 
stages of the narrative task. Each type of reference marker is presented with a distinct colour.
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maintaining stage (β = −0.95, SE = .28, t = −3.41) and the 
reintroduction stage (β = −.90, SE = .34, t = −2.68), while 
only a trend emerged for the introduction stage (β =
−.52, SE = .29, t = −1.81).
Indefinite markers
The comparisons of logistic models revealed an effect of 
the addressee’s likely knowledge (X2(2) = 21.8, p < .001) 
and no interaction between the addressee’s likely knowl-
edge and task/stage (X2(3) = 2.43, p = .487) on the pro-
duction of indefinite markers. However, further 
examination of the proportions with which participants 
used indefinite markers for each task/stage revealed 
numerically modest differences between the likely 
known and the likely unknown conditions and, as 
shown in Table 4, the unbiased t-test could not confirm 
the effects. The observed effect of the addressee’s knowl-
edge should thus be considered with care as it likely 
reflects differences in the number of non-cases (the “n 
Other” columns in Table 4), rather than a real difference 
in proportions between the likely known and likely 
unknown conditions (see Supplement for additional 
information on this bias).
For the participant’s own knowledge, comparisons of 
logistic models revealed a significant effect (X2(2) = 13.6, 
p = .001) while the interaction with task/discourse stage 
did not reach significance (X2(3) = 7.26, p = .064). Given 
the trend-level probability for the interaction, we none-
theless examined the effects for each task/stage. As 
shown in Table 4, participants used indefinite markers 
more often for movies they had not seen both during 
the identification task and during the introduction 
stage of the narration task, but not during the maintain-
ing or the reintroduction stage. In the model that 
included the interaction, the parameters indicated no 
significant difference from the identification task for 
the introduction stage (β = −.08, SE = .33, t = −0.24) and 
only trends for reduced effects during the maintaining 
(β = .62, SE = .32, t = 1.96) and the reintroduction stages 
(β = .76, SE = .40, t = 1.91).
Definite markers
The comparisons of logistic models revealed an effect of 
the addressee’s likely knowledge (X2(2) = 67.8, p < .001) 
and no interaction between the addressee’s likely knowl-
edge and the task/stage (X2(3) = 2.5, p = .473) on the
Table 3. Results for the adjustments in the use of character’s names at the different discourse stages.
Identification task Narration task
Introduction Introduction Maintaining Reintroduction
n CN n Other % n CN n Other % n CN n Other % n CN n Other %
Effect of the addressee’s likely knowledge (for trials from movies the participant had seen)
Likely known 92 64 59.0% 56 15 78.9% 48 251 16.1% 35 22 61.4%
Likely unknown 39 65 37.5% 8 40 16.7% 2 141 1.4% 3 35 7.9%
LM comparisons X2(1) = 6.90, p = .008 X2(1) = 34.5, p < .001 X2(1) = 15.6, p < .001 X2(1) = 30.9, p < .001
t-tests t(34) = 3.20, p < .006 t(30) = 7.55, p < .001 t(30) = 5.34, p < .001 t(21) = 7.09, p < .001
Effect of the participant’s own knowledge (for likely unknown trials only)
Seen by SS 32 48 40% 7 22 24.1% 1 87 1.1% 2 15 11.8%
Not seen by SS 4 71 5.3% 1 27 3.6% 0 91 0.0% 0 15 0.0%
LM comparisons X2(1) = 21.3, p < .001 X2(1) = 5.98, p = .014 X2(1) = 1.35, N.S. X2(1) = 1.97, N.S.
t-tests t(30) = 4.72, p < .001 t(18) = 1.84, N.S. t(18) = 1.00, N.S. t(12) = 1.29, N.S.
Note: CN = Character’s names; Other = All other types of markers; LM = Logistic Model.
Table 4. Results for the adjustments in the use of indefinite markers at the different discourse stages.
Identification task Narration task
Introduction Introduction Maintaining Reintroduction
n IN n Other % n IN n Other % n IN n Other % n IN n Other %
Effect of the addressee’s likely knowledge (for trials from movies the participant had seen)
Likely known 16 140 10.3% 11 60 15.5% 1 298 0.3% 1 56 1.8%
Likely unknown 14 90 13.5% 16 32 33.3% 1 142 0.7% 1 37 2.6%
LM comparisons X2(1) = 4.49, p = .034 X2(1) = 7.47, p = .006 (X2(1) = 17.7, p < .001)a (X2(1) = 3.47, p = .062)a
t-tests t(34) = 0.61, N.S. t(30) = 1.92, N.S. t(30) = 0.78, N.S. t(21) = 0.78, N.S.
Effect of the participant’s own knowledge (for likely unknown trials only)
Seen by SS 12 68 15.0% 6 23 20.7% 1 87 1.1% 1 16 5.9%
Not seen by SS 30 45 40.0% 14 14 50.0% 2 89 2.2% 0 15 0.0%
LM comparisons X2(1) = 8.70, p = .003 X2(1) = 4.31, p = .038 X2(1) = 0.03, N.S. X2(1) = 0.24, N.S.
t-tests t(30) = 3.17, p < .006 t(18) = 2.25, p < .064 t(18) = 0.62, N.S. t(12) = 1.00, N.S.
Note: IN = Indefinite markers; Other = All other types of markers; LM = Logistic Model.
aThese statistics appear biased given the low number of indefinite markers combined with the uneven number of other cases. The statistics based on permu-
tations thus provide a more reliable estimate of these effects.
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production of definite markers. As presented in Table 5, 
definite markers, which denote intermediate levels of 
accessibility, were more often used to present the likely 
unknown characters.
For the participant’s own knowledge, comparisons of 
logistic models revealed a significant effect (X2(2) = 6.40, 
p = .041) while the interaction with task/stage did not 
reach significance (X2(3) = 7.6, p = .055). Given the 
trend-level probability of the interaction, we examined 
the effects for each task/stage. As shown in Table 5, the 
only condition in which participants used definite 
markers significantly more often for the movies they 
had not seen was the reintroduction stage of the narra-
tion task. The effects for the other task/stages were not 
significant (introduction and maintaining) or showed a 
trend in the opposite direction (identification task; see 
Table 5). In the model that included the interaction, the 
parameters indicated that, compared to the identifi-
cation task, the effect significantly differed during the 
reintroduction stage (β = −1.32, SE = .47, t = −2.78), 
consistent with the observation of effects going in oppo-
site directions. There was however no significant differ-
ence from the identification task for the introduction 
(β = −.27, SE = .39, t = −0.69) or the maintaining stages 
(β = −.33, SE = .34, t = −0.95).
Pronouns
The comparisons of logistic models revealed a significant 
effect of the addressee’s likely knowledge (X2(2) = 9.44, 
p = .009) and no interaction with task/stage (X2(3) = 
0.76, p = .860) on the production of unaccented pro-
nouns (see Table 6). However, the unbiased t-test could 
not confirm the effects, suggesting that the comparison 
of the logistic models with and without the knowledge 
status should be considered with care as it likely reflects 
differences in the number of non-cases (the “n Other” 
columns in Table 6), rather than a real difference in pro-
portions between the likely known and likely unknown
conditions (see Supplement for additional information 
on this bias).
For the participant’s own knowledge, comparisons of 
logistic models revealed no significant main effect (X2(2) 
= 3.11, p = .211) but the interaction with task/stage was 
significant (X2(3) = 10.6, p = .014). As shown in Table 6, 
the only condition in which participants used pronouns 
significantly more often for movies they had not seen 
was the introduction stage. The effects at the other 
stages were not significant (introduction and maintain-
ing) or showed a trend in the opposite direction (reintro-
duction; see Table 6). In the model that included the 
interaction, the parameters indicated that, compared to 
the identification task, there were significant differences 
with the maintaining stage (β = .82, SE = .33, t = 2.46) and 
the reintroduction stage (β = 1.33, SE = .45, t = 2.93), but 
not with the introduction stage (β = .75, SE = .40, t = 
1.90).
A further examination of the pronouns used in the 
identification task revealed that in this context pronouns 
were typically used in expressions such as “Il a une cape 
rouge” (“He has a red cape”).
Discussion
This study relied on a new experimental task to assess 
whether speakers adapt their choices of referential 
expressions on a stimulus by stimulus basis when intro-
ducing, maintaining or reintroducing movie characters 
that vary in terms of the likelihood that they will be 
known to their addressee. Given that egocentric biases 
have previously been reported in language production, 
we also assessed the effect of the participant’s own 
knowledge. Consistent with our hypotheses, results 
from this study showed that participants adapted their 
referential choices depending on the likely knowledge 
of an addressee, here a woman in her 20s. This was 
reflected by an increased use of names when referring 
to a likely known character and an increased use of
Table 5. Results for the adjustments in the use of definite markers at the different discourse stages.
Identification task Narration task
Introduction Introduction Maintaining Reintroduction
n D+ n Other % n D+ n Other % n D+ n Other % n D+ n Other %
Effect of the addressee’s likely knowledge (for trials from movies the participant had seen)
Likely known 15 141 9.6% 4 67 5.6% 5 294 1.7% 10 47 17.5%
Likely unknown 27 77 26.0% 21 27 43.8% 12 131 8.4% 22 16 57.9%
LM comparisons X2(1) = 18.7, p < .001 X2(1) = 22.9, p < .001 (X2(1) = 20.2, p < .001)a X2(1) = 14.6, p < .001
t-tests t(34) = 3.46, p < .002 t(30) = 3.96, p < .002 t(30) = 1.67, N.S. t(21) = 3.84, p < .003
Effect of the participant’s own knowledge (for likely unknown trials only)
Seen by SS 22 58 27.5% 13 16 44.8% 11 77 12.5% 9 8 52.9%
Not seen by SS 10 65 13.3% 12 16 42.8% 10 81 11.1% 14 1 93.3%
LM comparisons X2(1) = 3.21, p = .073 X2(1) = 0.06, N.S. X2(1) = 0.01, N.S. X2(1) = 5.30, p = .021
t-tests t(30) = 1.36, N.S. t(18) = 0.55, N.S. t(18) = 0.01, N.S. t(12) = 2.00, N.S.
Note: D+ = Definite markers; Other = All other types of markers; LM = Logistic Model.
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during the narration task, especially for the maintaining 
and the reintroduction stage. For definite references 
and pronouns, the main effect of the participant’s own 
knowledge was not significant (though a trend 
emerged for definite markers) and the interaction 
reflected effects that were in opposite directions for 
the reintroduction stage of the narration task compared 
to the identification task. The effects for definite refer-
ences and pronouns did not approach significance for 
the other stages of narration (introduction and 
maintaining).
For the pronouns, the significant effect of the partici-
pant’s own knowledge during the identification task was 
in the opposite direction than what would be expected if 
pronouns were used for more accessible referents (i.e. we 
observed greater use for the movie characters that the 
participants did not know during the identification 
task). As mentioned in the results section, the use of pro-
nouns in this context occurred in sentences such as “He 
has a red cape”, something that happened infrequently 
and mainly in the identification task. The effect during 
the reintroduction stage did not reach significance but 
was in the expected direction.
For the definite markers, the only stage at which the 
effect of the participant’s knowledge reached signifi-
cance was the reintroduction stage, with a very high pro-
portion of definite references for movies the participants 
had not seen (93.3%). When they had seen the movies, 
participants still used a majority of definite references 
to reintroduce the likely unknown characters (52.9%) 
but they also used a surprisingly high proportion of pro-
nouns (29.4%). This pattern of results is in line with pre-
vious studies that reported increased use of pronouns 
when the referents are more accessible to the speaker 
(Fukumura & van Gompel, 2012; Vogels et al., 2015). 
However, we have to stress that even if the speakers 
were influenced their own knowledge, they were also 
clear effects of the addressee’s likely knowledge, consist-
ent with the long held view that the addressee is
Table 6. Results for the adjustments in the use of pronouns at the different discourse stages.
Identification task Narration task
Introduction Introduction Maintaining Reintroduction
n PR n Other % n PR n Other % n PR n Other % n PR n Other %
Effect of the addressee’s likely knowledge (for trials from movies the participant had seen)
Likely known 9 147 5.8% 0 71 0.0% 245 54 81.9% 11 46 19.3%
Likely unknown 10 94 9.6% 1 47 2.1% 127 16 88.8% 12 26 31.6%
LM comparisons (X2(1) = 8.26, p = .004)a (X2(1) = 22.3, p < .001)a X2(1) = 0.97, N.S. X2(1) = 1.2, N.S.
t-tests t(34) = 1.17, N.S. t(30) = 1.00, N.S. t(30) = 1.12, N.S. t(21) = 0.82, N.S.
Effect of the participant’s own knowledge (for likely unknown trials only)
Seen by SS 5 75 6.3% 1 28 3.5% 74 14 84.1% 5 12 29.4%
Not seen by SS 19 56 25.3% 1 27 3.6% 78 13 86.7% 1 14 6.7%
LM comparisons X2(1) = 7.66, p = .006 X2(1) = 0.04, N.S. X2(1) = 0.04, N.S. X2(1) = 3.14, p = .076
t-tests t(30) = 2.05, p < .061 t(18) = 0.00, N.S. t(18) = 0.00, N.S. t(12) = 1.14, N.S.
Note: PR = Pronouns; Other = All other types of markers; LM = Logistic Model.
definite expressions for likely unknown characters. These 
effects of the addressee’s likely knowledge were 
observed for all the task/stages conditions, namely the 
identification task and the introduction, maintaining 
and reintroduction stages of the narration task. Names 
and definite expressions thus showed complementary 
distributions across our different task conditions. Inter-
estingly, the effect of the addressee’s likely knowledge 
on the use of names increased following the initial 
mention of the character in the identification task, 
suggesting that further adjustments can happen as the 
verbal interaction progresses. In a previous paper 
(Achim et al., 2015), we however reported that in that 
same identification task, participants who used names 
tended to combine these names with additional descrip-
tive information, saying for example “it is Leonidas, he 
has a beard and a red cape”. While such combinations 
were frequently observed during the identification task 
(Achim et al., 2015), shorter forms may have been 
favoured during the narration task, leading participants 
to use definite references without first mentioning the 
name when presenting likely unknown characters. None-
theless, the effect of the addressee’s likely knowledge on 
the use of names was already significant during the 
identification task, though even more pronounced 
when introducing or reintroducing referents in the narra-
tion task.
When assessing the effect of the participant’s own 
knowledge, the analyses revealed either significant or 
trend-level interactions with task/stages for all four 
types of references (names, indefinite, definite and pro-
nouns), further highlighting the adjustments that occur 
as the verbal interaction unfolds. For names and indefi-
nite reference, there was also a main effect of the partici-
pant’s knowledge, with more names when the 
participant had seen the movies and more indefinite 
references when the participant had not seen the 
movie. These effects were however most important 
during the identification task and were then reduced
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important to consider when making reference choices 
(Clark & Marshall, 1981; Clark, Schreuder, & Buttrick, 
1983; Isaacs & Clark, 1987).
Adjustments to the addressee’s likely knowledge 
across discourse stages
Even if participants’ personal knowledge significantly 
influenced their use of names during the identification 
task, at least to the extent that participants were 
unable to name characters that they did not know, 
when they did know the characters they still markedly 
adapted their choices of referential expressions to their 
addressee’s likely knowledge. It was interesting that 
the use of the character’s name was affected by the 
likely knowledge of the addressee even when maintain-
ing a character in focus. This observation goes against 
our initial hypothesis that there would be no modulation 
of referential choices related to the addressee’s likely 
knowledge for the maintaining stage. Given that there 
were always two male characters in the narrative 
sequences, it is possible however that names known by 
both the participant and the addressee were used to 
avoid confusion, even if chances of confusion were low 
given that the character was maintained (Arnold & 
Griffin, 2007). While names and definite expressions 
tended to have complementary distributions throughout 
the discourse stages, names being more likely used for 
likely known movies and definite expressions for likely 
unknown movies, there was a relatively low rate of defi-
nite expressions used for maintaining a character in 
focus. This observation is consistent with the model of 
Ariel (Ariel, 1990, 1996) that predicts the preferred use 
of definite expressions for referents with lower accessibil-
ity levels.
It was suggested that speakers can be affected by an 
egocentric bias when they initially plan their utterances 
and that they subsequently monitor and adjust these 
plans to take common ground with their addressee 
into account (Horton & Keysar, 1996). In this study, an 
effect of the participant’s own knowledge was generally 
greater when introducing the referents and thereafter 
reduced or even reversed. This observation is consistent 
with a model in which the initial plan and hence the 
initial mention of a given referent is particularly affected 
by the speaker’s own perspective, while subsequent 
mentions seem less affected by the speaker’s knowledge 
but remain affected by the speaker’s evaluation of his 
addressee’s knowledge.
Given that in this study the addressee always dis-
played prototypical knowledge, the factors that led the 
speakers to determine the addressee’s likely knowledge 
would however need to be further clarified. More
specifically, the influence of the initial assumptions 
about the addressee’s knowledge (global adaptation 
based on stereotypes) and the influence of the addres-
see’s feedback (local adaptation based on previous feed-
backs) could not be disentangled (Brennan et al., 2010). 
In addition, it remains possible that not knowing a 
given character led the participants to judge that the 
addressee was less likely to know that character. Future 
studies could clarify the findings about the effect of 
the address’s likely knowledge by further distinguishing 
the impact of initial, discourse external influences (ex: 
the speaker’s initial assessment of the address’s knowl-
edge based on stereotypes, with a possible influence of 
his/her own knowledge), versus discourse-internal influ-
ences acquired during the interaction (ex: the addres-
see’s feedback for previous items), given that both 
sources of information could potentially influence the 
speaker’s assessment of the address’s likely knowledge 
for future referents.
Reference choices at different task/stages
The pattern of results clearly indicates that names and 
definite expressions are not restricted to specific dis-
course stages but rather used in diverse contexts, with 
the choice of names or definite expressions influenced 
by prior knowledge that can be attributed to the addres-
see, consistent with Ariel’s accessibility model (Ariel, 
1990) and Gundel et al.’s givenness hierarchy (Gundel 
et al., 1993, 2012).
In contrast, indefinite markers and pronouns were 
used at more specific discourse stages, respectively intro-
duction and maintenance, and there was no convincing 
evidence of an influence of the addressee’s likely knowl-
edge. These observations are consistent with the sugges-
tion that introducing and maintaining references with 
these markers “can be based on the properties of the dis-
course and does not require the speaker to mentalise 
about the listener’s knowledge” (p. 395, Hendriks et al., 
2014 see also Kuijper, Hartman, & Hendriks, 2015). Inter-
estingly, indefinite markers and pronouns are linked to 
the two opposite extremes of accessibility in the dis-
course (Gundel et al., 1993, 2012), with indefinite 
markers being preferred for low-accessibility referents 
that have not yet been introduced (Gundel et al., 1993, 
2012), while pronouns are preferred for highly accessible 
referents that are maintained in focus (Ariel, 1990, 1996; 
Gundel et al., 1993, 2012).
Hendriks et al. had also suggested that “topic shift cru-
cially requires speakers to take into account the listener’s 
perspective” (p. 395, Hendriks et al., 2014; Kuijper et al., 
2015), and our results support this idea but also further 
document that the listener’s perspective can influence
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choices of referring expressions at different discourse 
stages, especially when it comes to the use of definite 
expressions or names.
Overall, our results suggest that names and definite 
expressions are influenced by the speaker’s assessment 
of the addressee’s likely knowledge across discourse 
stages, while indefinite markers are rather influenced 
by the speaker’s personal knowledge, in particular 
when introducing the referents. This study thus support 
the sug-gestion that “reference production during 
dialogue is shaped not only by one’s partner’s state of 
mind, as pre-dicted by the collaborative approach, but 
also by infor-mation availability from one’s own 
point of view” (p. 339; Knutsen & Le Bigot, 2012).
Limitations and strengths of this study
One limitation of this study that has to be acknowledged 
is that the identification task was always performed 
before the narration task, and the main character from 
the six narrative sequences were all part of the identifi-
cation task. It is thus possible that the characters were 
not perceived as novel characters when beginning the 
narration task, and this could have affected our results, 
in particular during the introduction stage. Another limit-
ation is that the movie knowledge questionnaire only 
asked participants if they had seen the movies or not 
and did not include questions about whether they 
knew the names of the movie characters. While it 
remains possible that participants could have used 
more names for the likely known characters because 
they could better recollect these names, the effect of 
the participant’s own knowledge on their use of names 
was restricted to the identification task and to the intro-
duction of the narration task, while the effect of the 
addressee’s likely knowledge on the use of names was 
significant across both tasks and across all discourse 
stages, even increasing following the initial mention in 
the identification task. This suggests that while the par-
ticipant’s own knowledge and the addressee’s likely 
knowledge both influence the choices of referential 
expressions when identifying a new referent, it is truly 
the speaker’s assessment of the addressee’s likely knowl-
edge that influenced the choices of referential 
expressions when referring to the different characters 
in the context of a narrative discourse.
Despite these limitations, our study is the first one to 
target the effect of the addressee’s likely knowledge in a 
narrative context. In addition, previous item-identifi-
cation task had either focussed on the speaker’s evalu-
ation of the addressee’s knowledge for the full set of 
items in the task (Isaacs & Clark, 1987), or for items for 
which the address’s knowledge did not need to be
evaluated by the speaker given that items were abstract 
shapes for which the names were learned by the speaker 
with only a subset being also learned by the addressee 
(Heller et al., 2012; Wu & Keysar, 2007). Only one recently 
published study examined adjustments to the address’s 
likely knowledge on an item by item basis, but that pre-
vious study, like the ones previously cited (Achim et al., 
2015), focussed the analyses on the type of information 
included in the reference (ex: name, description, name 
plus description, etc.). The current study is thus the first 
one to assess the effect of the speaker’s assessment of 
the addressee’s likely knowledge on the choices of refer-
ence markers (pronouns, types of determiners, also 
including names).
Conclusion
This study revealed a very interesting pattern of results in 
which the adaptation in the use of referential expressions 
was sometimes linked to the addressee’s likely knowl-
edge (for names and definite expressions across both 
tasks) and sometimes influenced by the participant’s per-
sonal knowledge (particularly indefinite expressions and 
names). Overall, this study thus represents an important 
advance in the study of the factors that affect the use of 
specific referential expressions. First, it introduces a 
method which allowed us to distinguish the three main 
discourse stages in narrative speech. Second, it presents 
unique evidence for a modulation of the use of referen-
tial expressions as a function of the addressee’s likely 
knowledge not only during the presentation of indepen-
dent stimuli, but also at all three discourse stages, 
namely the introduction of new referents, the mainten-
ance of highly accessible referents and the reintroduc-
tion of a referent that was previously not in focus. This 
effect observed even during the maintaining stage rep-
resent an important finding of this study. Third, it docu-
ments an effect of the speaker’s personal knowledge that 
is particularly important during the identification of new 
referents. Overall, these results further our understand-
ing of the factors that affect choices of referential 
expressions at different stages during a natural verbal 
interaction with another person.
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